Mill come to mind as holding ethics that lack the kind of ground that one that one ought to do something. On that score, non-theistic moralities hit a one ought to do what one prefers, or that which is the greatest good for the of which are antithetical to a thorough-going morality. Beyond this, Rist is also wary of theists who think that one can ground morality independently of God by thinking that they can successfully argue for some standards of morality merely consistent with a theistic morality but, for the sake of epistemological integrity, disconnect their lines of argumentation or support PAUL SYMINGTON of grounding morality by way of claiming that through practical reasoning approach one must identify God, the object of religion, as essentially related to the basic good of religion.
--point on this issue is not possible.
rality-those theists who try to build a case for grounding morality indedoes not accept a theistic foundation for morality that one ought not to try to score moral points without appeal to God. That is, do all arguments that theistic ethicist will need to appeal to God for a fully robust ethical theory, -argument for a particular point of morality that can be made independently made along the way.
of lapsing into a kind of triumphalism. A Christian moral triumphalism in teaching on morality is thought of as being complete and independent in the --which Christian and non-Christian alike can each identify. Such a recognition -By identifying acts that are not grounded in belief in God as without moral foundation is to simply undermine their ethical status altogether. If they are heed them when seeking to follow a particularly Christian moral ethic. Finally, Rist seems to assume that a necessary condition for a moral belief being grounded is whether or not one can rationally identify a duty, not a necessary condition for an action being moral; and so, a fortiori, it need not be a condition for an action being morally grounded. That is, one may we make a moral choice absent of moral obligation. Such is the case with a moral choice when one has chosen a particular career path for the right are moral, but one cannot do both. Thus, it is not clear to me that when one choice must be morally ungrounded. That is, it seems that in some cases in -bial old lady cross the street merely because they see it as a good thing to do choices without God. ought either to do this or that), is not clear to me that in granting these knowledge of it as an ought or as rational. That is, it seems reasonable, for happiness, so in order to be happy one ought to act in certain ways so as to has a basic or fundamental rational intuition into basic goods and this intuition occurs independently of belief in God. Rist seems to imply that this it can be grounded in something else. Why not simply say that one has had --ing. Perhaps a choice has moral grounding when it is enacted with a combi--nition that it is ordered in some way to contributing to their happiness. I want to be happy, and I cannot act otherwise with respect to this, and so I ought to do this in order to be happy. Of course at this point, one need not wonder eudaimonistic ethics. Such an ethic has hapis obtained in conformity with a rational process of choice, and allows for actions to be optional and moral; that there are a range of goods (either truly or according to an appearance) that one ought to obtain in a rational way so as to obtain genuine or true goods (determined, perhaps, as being mutually consistent and obtainable or intuited as ordered to a basic good). In addition, goods and so the object of God is left as an open question, without being eudaimonistic ethics to be merely about obtaining those goods that are primarily -perfection that is personally grounded in God; I must become less so that He may become more. In this way, a Christian ethic becomes fundamentally re-oriented and grounded in communion, humility, and grace.
him for his contribution to our progress in thinking about this fundamental issue.
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